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THE NEW ORIGINALISM AND THE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION
Andrew Kent*
INTRODUCTION
The influence of originalism in the legal academy is large and growing.
And the U.S. Supreme Court has relied heavily on originalism in certain
domestic, individual rights cases like District of Columbia v. Heller.1 But
foreign affairs is different. In that area, originalism is, as Ingrid Wuerth has
observed, “generally speaking, not the way courts or the Executive Branch
and Congress actually interpret the Constitution.”2
In fact, there are dozens of important Supreme Court decisions on
constitutional foreign affairs issues that pay little or no attention to the
original meaning of specific textual provisions of the Constitution.3 The
most influential legal framework for modern foreign affairs decisionmaking
is Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, which begins with an attack on the utility and possibility of
* Professor, Fordham Law School; Faculty Advisor, Center on National Security at
Fordham Law School. Thanks to Corey Brettschneider, Martin Flaherty, Tom Lee, Ethan
Leib, and Benjamin Zipursky for helpful comments on an earlier version, and to Mike
Schwartz for research assistance.
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657,
659 (2009) (calling Heller “the most thoroughgoing originalist opinion in the Court’s
history”). For other Supreme Court decisions in domestic cases relying substantially on
originalist evidence, see, for example, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–56 (2004)
(interpreting the Confrontation Clause).
2. Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 5, 9 n.19
(2008).
3. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Zivotofsky ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008);
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44
(1958); United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.
481 (1931); MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 297 (1909); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
603 (1850).
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originalism4 and proceeds to lay out a decisional schema based on
functional considerations and realism about contemporary politics and
institutional dynamics.5 Even when the Court purports to spend some time
on text and history in foreign affairs cases, as it did in Boumediene v. Bush6
or United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,7 for example, it often skips
any sustained textual analysis, references Founding-era history at a very
high level of generality, and ends up finding that nonhistorical
considerations such as precedent, functionalism, and abstract constitutional
principles are decisive. Constitutional interpretation by the political
branches is often nonoriginalist as well.
Notwithstanding the relatively modest impact that originalism has in the
governmental practice of foreign affairs law today, its prominence in legal
scholarship and in domestic, individual rights opinions by the Supreme
Court more than justifies spending some time thinking about challenges that
the “new originalism”—the latest version of the originalist method—faces
in interpreting the foreign affairs aspects of the Constitution.
After sketching the basics of the new originalist method, I first suggest
that new originalism struggles to decide how to handle background norms
of the common law or the law of nations, which were understood by some
members of the Founding generation to implicitly qualify or restrict parts of
the constitutional text. These issues are omnipresent in foreign affairs law
because courts, executive officials, and other interpreters must decide
whether the boundaries of the Constitution’s broadly written protections for
life, liberty, and property extend to domains such as wartime or
extraterritorial activity by the U.S. government, or to persons beyond the
paradigm case of U.S. citizens within the United States.
Second, I suggest that the exacting textualism practiced by many new
originalists might only imperfectly understand certain aspects of the foreign
affairs provisions of the Constitution. This is because some of it was
drafted hastily and poorly, certain important topics were seemingly not
addressed at all, and some Founding-era interpreters understood the foreign
affairs portions of the Constitution in a holistic manner focused on purpose
and structure, instead of parsing text in the manner of new originalism.
This potentially large gap between results reached by new originalism and
4. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan
debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt
quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each
other.”).
5. See generally MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
53 (2007) (noting that Jackson’s opinion did not consider originalist evidence or arguments);
Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown’s Shadow, 53 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 29, 30–35 (2008) (noting the same, and also suggesting that Jackson’s functionalism
rather than originalism is the dominant mode of separation-of-powers analysis by the
Supreme Court today).
6. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
7. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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the expectations and practices of the Founders raises questions about new
originalism’s claim to be based on the public meaning of the text to the
adopting generation. And if many foreign affairs provisions of the
Constitution have an underdeterminate original public meaning, originalism
cannot answer many constitutional questions, and the ultimate usefulness of
the method is called into question.
I. THE NEW ORIGINALISM
Originalism is a famously diverse and evolving phenomenon that has
proven hard for both its defenders and critics to pin down for any length of
time. “[A] fairly basic definition of originalism” is that it “regards the
discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption
as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.”8
The “new originalism” is not a single theory but a family of related theories
about how to discover and apply this meaning. I will not try to convey all
the nuances of the debates between and among new originalists and their
critics,9 but instead make some general comments about how I understand
the theory.
Because of the well-known theoretical and methodological problems
with old originalism’s focus on either the original intent of the
Constitution’s drafters or the original understanding of its ratifiers,10 a
number of prominent contemporary originalists have shifted to what is
often called new originalism or original public meaning originalism.11 This
new originalism focuses on the objective linguistic meaning that the text of
the Constitution would likely have had to an American audience at the time
of adoption.
New originalists differ in how they define the person or group whose
usage of words and phrases is the measure of original public meaning. For
some, it is simply a “reasonable” or perhaps “reasonably well-informed”
person in late eighteenth-century America.12 Lawrence Solum, one of the
most influential theorists of new originalism, suggests that new originalism
should look to how meaning would be understood by an “ordinary
8. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599
(2004).
9. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO.
L.J. 713 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009).
10. See Colby, supra note 9, at 723–24 (discussing some of the criticisms); William
Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and
the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 494 (2007) (same). The dated but
classic article in the genre is Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
11. William Treanor and some others call it textualism. See Treanor, supra note 10, at
488 n.1.
12. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 92 (“a reasonable listener”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91
GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003) (“a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader”).
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American citizen fluent in English,” such as “farmers, seamstresses,
shopkeepers, and even lawyers.”13 As discussed below in Part II.B.7, other
new originalists describe somewhat different groups of language users as
the measure of meaning.
Excavating the public meaning of words and phrases to readers requires
the new originalist to determine two things, says Solum: “(1) the
conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases that make up the
text and (2) the rules of syntax and grammar that combine the words and
phrases.”14 The best way to make these determinations is, again according
to Solum, a “large-scale empirical investigation of the ways that words and
phrases were used in ordinary written and spoken English,”15 employing
dictionaries, grammar books, contemporary newspapers, records of how
words were used and how terms were discussed in framing and ratification
debates, and other sources bearing on usage.16
Most new originalists emphasize that their search is for the inherent
“linguistic” or “semantic” meaning of the words of the Constitution, not the
“expectations” that the Founding-era public held or would have held about
how the linguistic meaning of the Constitution’s words would have applied
in practice to concrete phenomena existing at the time of adoption.17
New originalists often posit a two-step process for answering
constitutional questions. First, one must perform an empirical inquiry to
ascertain “the semantic meaning of a particular use of language in
context.”18 This is “interpretation.”19 The second step, “construction,” is
“the activity of applying that meaning to particular factual
circumstances.”20 Oftentimes, the text is clear enough that the decision
about how to apply it “follows directly” and “automatically from the
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text,”21 and “construction will look
indistinguishable in practice from interpretation.”22 But when the semantic
meaning of the Constitution’s words is highly abstract or vague,
construction becomes critical.

13. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 3 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011).
Historian Jack Rakove, with his tongue in cheek, calls this reader posited by some new
originalists “Joe the Ploughman.” Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the
Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575
(2011).
14. Solum, supra note 13, at 1.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012
U. ILL. L. REV. 623, 626; Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor
Balkin’s Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 669 (2009); Solum, supra note 13, at 10.
17. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 9, at 6–7; Solum, supra note 13, at 11; Whittington,
supra note 8, at 611.
18. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65,
66 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. (emphasis omitted).
20. Id. (emphasis omitted).
21. Solum, supra note 13, at 23.
22. Barnett, supra note 18, at 67.
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New originalists differ among themselves in many ways. For example,
they have varying interpretations of the breadth of the “construction zone,”
(to use Solum’s phrase23), of which modalities may be used when
construction is needed (for instance, principles underlying the text,
precedent, history, values, functional considerations, and the like24), of
which institutions or actors are empowered to perform construction, and of
how binding that construction is.25
Perhaps the biggest difference among new originalists is not theoretical,
but comes when they apply their theories to actual constitutional text. My
sense is that many new originalists—for instance, John McGinnis, Steven
Calabresi, and Michael Rappaport—believe that the text of the Constitution
is generally quite specific and determinate, so that interpretation does not
usually need to be supplemented by construction and a nearly complete
originalist Constitution can be discerned.26 Other new originalists, most
notably Jack Balkin, seem to find the text of the Constitution quite general
and, therefore, pervasively open to nonoriginalist supplementation through
construction.27 Some new originalists may occupy a middle ground.28 This
difference in approach has enormous practical consequences for what the
Constitution would look like if subject to originalist analysis and
implementation.
II. NEW ORIGINALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
UNWRITTEN LIMITS TO THE TEXT
A number of significant foreign relations issues turn on the relationship
between unwritten rules of the common law and the law of nations, on the
one hand, and the text of the Constitution on the other. Whether and when
23. Solum, supra note 13, at 26.
24. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 9, at 4 (defining “constitutional construction” as
“implementing and applying the Constitution using all of the various modalities of
interpretation: arguments from history, structure, ethos, consequences, and precedent”);
Barnett, supra note 18, at 70–71 (noting that new originalism cannot answer the normative
question of what methods of construction should be employed). See generally Ethan J. Leib,
The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358 (2007)
(noting that originalists disagree “about what sorts of considerations may legitimately be
considered at the ‘back end,’” that is, as part of what many new originalists call
construction).
25. And some new originalists reject construction altogether, preferring to resolve
ambiguity and vagueness by applying the interpretive methods and default rules that the
adopting generation would have used. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Michael Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 878 (2009) (“[M]any constitutional provisions’
meanings become much less vague or unspecific if the interpreter properly attends to the
meaning such words and phrases would have had, in context, to a reasonably informed
speaker or reader of the language, at the time of the language’s enactment as part of the
Constitution. That is to say, if one is a good practitioner of original-meaning textualism, the
asserted vagueness frequently disappears.”).
27. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 646 (2013).
28. See generally Barnett, supra note 18.
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to read the text according to its apparent plain meaning or to limit or qualify
it by reference to unwritten nonconstitutional rules is an extraordinarily
hard question that new originalism—with its focus on the objective public
meaning of the written text for an ordinary, reasonable person of the late
eighteenth century—has not satisfactorily answered.
A. The Constitution’s Domain
A fundamental question of U.S. foreign affairs law concerns the domain
or the territorial and personal scope of the Constitution: where, when, in
what circumstances, and on whose behalf does the Constitution provide
individual protections against the U.S. government. These domain
questions are complex because most of the key individual rights-protecting
provisions of both the Bill of Rights and the original 1787 Constitution are
written in broad terms—apparently unrestricted as to person, place, status,
or the nature of the government activity or interest asserted. The Due
Process Clause, for example, provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”29 Did the
broad and unqualified term “person” have a broad and unqualified original
public meaning? Or, did rules of the common law, law of nations, or other
unwritten rules or principles implicitly limit it so that certain people in
certain places—or certain categories of U.S. government activity—fell
outside its protections?
Domain questions of this type are at the heart of many classic foreign
relations and national security disputes in U.S. history. To be useful in the
foreign affairs area, originalism must provide an account of what the
relevant provisions of the Constitution, as understood by an ordinary,
reasonable member of the adopting generation, say about the following
controversies. Did aliens in the United States have constitutional rights that
the 1798 Alien Acts threatened to infringe?30 After secession and the start
of the Civil War, did individual constitutional rights limit how the U.S.
government conducted war against the wayward U.S. citizens of the
Confederacy?31 Did U.S. civilians in a loyal state during the Civil War
have constitutional rights against military trial?32 Did U.S. citizens tried by
U.S. government consular courts in “uncivilized” foreign jurisdictions have
constitutional rights?33 Did admitted members of the German military who
sneaked into the United States on a sabotage mission during World War II
have the right to habeas corpus and individual constitutional rights against
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also id. art. I, § 9 (“The privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended . . . .”); id. (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.”); id. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”); id. amend. II (“[T]he
right of the people . . . .”); id. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In
all criminal prosecutions . . . .”).
30. See J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution,
95 GEO. L.J. 463, 527–31 (2007).
31. See generally Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil
War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2010).
32. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118 (1866).
33. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 462–65 (1891).
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military trial?34 What about German military spies tried by a U.S. military
tribunal in China in the aftermath of World War II and imprisoned in U.S.occupied Germany?35 Did noncitizens detained by the U.S. military on
U.S.-controlled, but not sovereign, territory because they were allegedly
combatants in terrorist groups against which Congress had authorized the
use of military force have a right to habeas corpus or individual
constitutional rights?36
Old originalism privileges the intentions and understandings of Framers
and ratifiers, many of whom were learned, legally sophisticated (if not also
practicing lawyers), and experienced in the art of governing,37 and therefore
reasonably likely to be aware of rules of the common law and the law of
nations and how they would empower or restrict government and expand or
contract otherwise broad individual rights. My prior writings, and
important work by Philip Hamburger, suggest that many Framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights would have expected and
understood that the rights-granting aspects of the Constitution would have a
domain limited in various respects by citizenship, territorial location, and
enemy status.38 In particular, the common law and the law of nations39
were understood to limit the substantive and procedural rights of enemy
aliens (nationals of an enemy nation during wartime), nonresident aliens
even if not enemies, and enemy fighters, no matter what their territorial
location. The methodology of old originalism would thus tend to confirm
that unwritten rules of common law or the law of nations could and did
trump broad constitutional text in some instances. For instance, James
Madison explained to the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the broad
language about jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution was qualified
by the rule of the common law and the law of nations that alien enemies
were barred from court during wartime.40
34. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1942).
35. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66 (1950).
36. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
470 (2004).
37. For example, nearly two-thirds of the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention had
legal training, and nearly three-quarters had served in the Continental Congress. See Sol
Bloom, Constitution of the United States: Questions & Answers, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES &
REC. ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_q_and_a.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013).
38. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1834–47
(2009); Kent, supra note 30, at 505–24; Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters:
The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153,
169–211 (2013).
39. In the eighteenth century, “[i]n its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised the
law merchant, maritime law, and the law of conflicts of laws, as well as the law governing
the relations between states.” Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early
American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 821–22 (1989). Thus, the law of nations differed
from the common law, even though prominent British jurists taught that “the law of nations
. . . is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of
the land.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *53.
40. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 484–86 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) (statement of James
Madison).
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B. New Originalism’s Approaches to Unwritten Limits on the
Constitution’s Domain
Because new originalism treats the understanding of the Constitution of
“any contemporaneous speaker of the English language” as equally
important to that of a Madison or Hamilton,41 new originalism seems likely
to produce quite different results than old originalism on some interpretive
questions. Take the example of the Due Process Clause. Using the
contemporary dictionaries, which many new originalists favor as a firstorder aid to interpretation, we find “person” defined in a comprehensive and
ordinary manner as, simply, a man or woman.42 Using an intratextual
method favored by some new originalists, we might note that the
description of the rightholder in the Due Process Clause (“person”) is
linguistically broader than other terms used in the document, for example
“citizen” or “the People,” which is seemingly a reference to the American
people who the Preamble tells us ordained and established the Constitution.
Several of the state constitutions promulgated in 1776 and thereafter
contained due process–type clauses that could be read as limiting the class
of rightholders to citizens of the particular state or perhaps of the United
States.43 Read against the background of these documents, the term
“person” in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might have
seemed, linguistically, to be a much broader and hence more encompassing
term.
Putting all of this linguistic evidence together, and reading it in the
context of the background premise that the new Constitution made the
granting of power inextricably linked with limitations on power, it seems
plausible that an ordinary member of the American public circa 1789 would
have read the Due Process Clause to protect the rights of men and women—
full stop. Thus, the Constitution’s domain—or at least the domain of its due
process protections, since we would still need to examine the specific
linguistic meaning of other parts of the text—might be universal.
But in fact, few, if any, of the men involved in framing and ratifying the
Constitution would have understood “person” in the Due Process Clause
this way. In giving us the linguistic or semantic meaning that a word or

41. Balkin, supra note 27, at 653.
42. See, e.g., GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY 705 (J. Morgan ed., London, W.
Strahan, J. Rivington & Sons, 10th ed. 1782) (“Person”: “A man or woman . . . .”); WILLIAM
PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 389 (London, W. Strahan, J. & F.
Rivington, 1st Am. ed. 1788) (“Person”: “a man or woman . . . .”); THOMAS SHERIDAN ET
AL., A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 713 (Phila., William Young, 6th
ed. 1796) (“Person”: “Individual man or woman; one’s self.”).
43. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XII (“[N]o subject shall be arrested,
imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII (“[N]o member of this
State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any the rights or privileges secured to the subjects
of this State by this constitution, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his
peers.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (“[E]very member of society hath a right to be
protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property . . . .”).
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phrase should or would have had to the Founding-era public, new
originalism might well produce an incomplete or misleading view of the
meaning of this Clause, and how the Framers or ratifiers would have
expected and understood this clause to fit within the U.S. Constitution and
the broader legal framework.
New originalists might have a number of possible responses to the claim
that their method could produce a reading of the domain of the Due Process
Clause that relatively few people intimately involved in adopting the
Constitution would have accepted. Each response has some merit, but none
is entirely satisfying.
1. Terms of Art
Was “person” a term of art? Most, if not all, new originalists assert that
terms of art must be given their specialized meaning.44 But to prevent a
word’s meaning from becoming untethered from the ordinary public
meaning, many new originalists suggest that we ought to give terms of art
their narrow technical meanings only if it is somehow apparent that they are
terms of art.45 Thus, new originalists can comfortably say that the ordinary,
objective public meaning of Article I, Section 8’s vesting of power in
Congress to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal” was its technical legal
meaning.46 But what about the very next power given to Congress: to
“make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”47 Every one of
those words seems like quintessentially ordinary, everyday, nontechnical
English.48 It is unclear on what basis new originalism could maintain that
the objective meaning of those words for an ordinary member of the public
would encompass a specialized understanding of the law of nations and
military practice that the drafters of the language brought to the
Constitution-writing project.49
The term “person” in the Due Process Clause also seems like
quintessentially ordinary, nontechnical English. Law dictionaries of the
Founding period did not tend to have any separate definition for “person,”
44. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 815, 818; Solum, supra note 9, at 970.
45. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 44, at 818; Solum, supra note 13, at 34–35.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
47. Id.
48. See generally Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV.
625, 651–52 (2012) (“If a phrase in the Constitution looks like a technical term, ordinary
citizens might assume that it is a legal term of art that they can leave to the experts to
interpret. . . . By contrast, it is unlikely that citizens would make a similar assumption about
plain language provisions of the Constitution, which include such ordinary sounding terms
as ‘Equal Protection,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘property,’ and ‘Commerce . . . among the several States.’ In
some cases, these seemingly ordinary terms could still have a technical meaning for legal
experts. But it is unlikely that members of the general public—even ‘reasonable’ ones—
would have understood them in that way.”).
49. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1683
(2009) (tracing the meaning of the language used in the Clause “through British and Colonial
Admiralty documents, prominent works of international law, the Revolutionary War and
Articles of Confederation, and the drafting and ratification of the Constitution”).
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which might have suggested to an average member of the reading public
that the word did not have a specialized legal meaning.50 I am not
convinced that it is properly considered a term of art within the new
originalist framework.
2. Contextual Meaning
Some new originalists have a different way of accommodating nonobvious, specialized meanings that certain words would have had to the
adopting generation. Solum, for example, says that the original public
linguistic meaning of the text to an ordinary member of the public can be
interpreted by “resort to those aspects of the framing and ratification of a
given constitutional provision that would have been available to the general
public.”51 He elsewhere calls this “the publicly available context of
constitutional utterance,” and notes that it includes knowledge about things
like the government created by the Articles of Confederation and the basic
facts of the British legal system.52 The underlying premise is quite similar
to the justification for giving terms of art a technical legal meaning: it
would have been somehow obvious in the public culture of the Founding
period that certain words have specialized meaning because of connection
to important public facts and debates.
That strikes me as a reasonable methodological move when the alleged
“context” is something that was widely discussed and understood by
average members of the late eighteenth-century public. But it seems
difficult to justify qualifying or trumping broad constitutional text by
reference to unwritten rules of the common law and the law of nations
unless, for example, a prominent legal or political event or widely
distributed public statement by a leading figure can reasonably be supposed
to have brought the issue to the fore.
3. The Choice of Broad Language Was a Delegation to the Future
New originalists might make another response to the problem I raised,
contending that when the Constitution uses words that have a very broad
semantic meaning, even if unwritten norms of common law or the law of
nations might have been intended or understood to limit their domain
during the Founding generation, fidelity to the document and the idea of
limited government under a written constitution requires us to follow the
broad semantic meaning. New originalists generally distinguish between
50. See, e.g., 2 RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 206 (John Burn ed., London,
T. Cadell 1792) (containing no separate entry for “person”); JOHN COWELL, A LAW
DICTIONARY 339 (Great Britain, J. Walthoe et al. 1727) (same); 2 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM,
NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY, OR, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 511
(London, J. Rivington et al., 3d ed. 1783) (same). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 19–32 (2013) (arguing that “person” in the
Due Process Clause was a term of art and is best read to encompass unborn human
embryos).
51. Solum, supra note 13, at 25.
52. Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted).
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original public meanings and original expected applications, and assert that
only the former are binding. If a meaning is extremely broad, so be it. As
Jack Balkin and others emphasize, “we should pay careful attention to the
reasons why constitutional designers choose particular kinds of
language.”53 If they chose narrow, precise language, it is “because they
want to limit discretion” in the future; on the other hand, a choice of broad
language is a choice to “delegate details to future generations,” to allow
future generations to apply the concept within the outer boundaries set by
the broad language used in the document.54
Since I assume this is not a backdoor way of smuggling in original intent,
it cannot be a descriptive claim about the intent of particular constitution
drafters or adopters. It would seem, therefore, to be a presumption
requiring justification, such as a normative one. I think it quite likely that if
Framers and ratifiers in 1787–88 thought that the Due Process Clause
would be interpreted to provide protections to all persons no matter their
citizenship, territorial location, or enemy status, many of them would
probably have demanded that a more precise and restrictive term be used
instead of “person.”55 And if we strongly suspect that is true as a historical
matter, then it would seem somewhat off the mark to rely on standard
normative defenses of originalism to justify interpreting potentially broad or
vague language as being intended to convey that kind of very capacious
discretion to the future. It is somewhat difficult to understand how using
originalism in this way constitutes “fidelity”56 to word choices by the
adopting generation and therefore supports popular government by tying the
people’s agents to the choices made by the people.57
4. Vagueness Allows Nonoriginalist Construction
A related potential response of new originalism is that the Due Process
Clause’s term “person” is, like many important parts of the Constitution,
very vague and underdeterminate. As a result, “interpretation” of the
original public meaning will only produce a “thin,” “framework” kind of
semantic meaning of the term, while a meaning “thick” enough to give
some truly determinate content to the constitutional provision can only be
produced by nonoriginalist “construction.”58 In most cases, this form of
argument is quite plausible. Indeed, it represents one of the major
theoretical advances of new originalism over the old, though it does come,
as Thomas Colby has noted, at the expense of originalism’s claims to

53. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 6.
54. Id. at 6–7.
55. But maybe not. Sometimes broad or vague language in constitutions or statutes is
used to paper over irreconcilable differences among the adopters.
56. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at pt. I (discussing “Fidelity”).
57. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007) (“[T]he most common and most influential justification for
originalism [is] popular sovereignty and the judicially enforced will of the people.”).
58. See Balkin, supra note 27, at 646–47.
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provide a determinate method that reins in judicial subjectivity.59 But when
we turn to the example of “person” and potential limits from the common
law and the law of nations, there is a hitch. It is a cardinal rule of new
originalism that construction may not contradict interpretation—that is,
construction may occur only within boundaries demarcated by
interpretation. Above, I suggested that the semantic meaning of person
might be “human being” (or perhaps “adult human being”). If so, a
construction using background rules of general law to read “person” to
mean, for example, “adult human being who is a U.S. citizen or, if not, is
present in the United States and whose home country is not at war with the
United States,” would seem to impermissibly undercut the broad,
unrestricted semantic meaning, not merely flesh it out and specify it.
5. Continuity with the Preexisting Legal System
A fifth approach to the problem that text-focused new originalism might
seem to produce a meaning that would have been rejected by many
members of the adopting generation is presented in an interesting recent
article by Stephen Sachs.60 The claim is that the Constitution was adopted
to be part of an ongoing legal system, and that it generally is unproblematic,
because this is how our legal system worked, to think that provisions of the
Constitution were defeasible—that is, could be defeated or limited by
preexisting unwritten rules of the common law or the law of nations. This
is an old idea. For instance, the debates in the Supreme Court’s first
blockbuster case, Chisholm v. Georgia,61 touch on it. Justice James Iredell
assumed in dissent that the preexisting sovereign immunity of the states
under the law of nations and common law survived under the new
Constitution,62 while the justices in the majority thought that the broad text
of the new Constitution’s Article III trumped.63
Sachs’s basic presumption often appears, like Iredell’s, to be continuity:
the Constitution was overlaid on a legal system that was already a going
concern, and so would have been generally understood to fit comfortably
within the rules of that preexisting legal system, including rules that
defeated otherwise broad and unlimited constitutional language.64 As a
general matter, it is clearly true that the Constitution fit within an ongoing
legal system. The Constitution did not purport to be a new code that would
displace all prior law. But, at least in some instances, any presumption of
continuity would be mistaken. As Martin Flaherty, Jack Rakove, and other
historians have emphasized, the Constitution emerged from a time of
revolutionary change, and represented such an extraordinarily new form of
government that many details were not thought about, much less worked

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Colby, supra note 9, at 714.
Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Id. at 435, 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
See, e.g., id. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
See Sachs, supra note 60, at 1817.
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out.65 Even the meaning of the concept of a “constitution” was debated
vigorously and changed significantly over the Revolutionary War and
Framing periods.66 The revolution went well beyond views about
government. Gordon Wood, for example, after documenting the huge
changes in views about the proper constitution of government that occurred
over a short period of time,67 then turned to writing about the
“momentously radical” changes in views about the social order during the
Revolutionary War period.68 Instability and discord marked debates about
interpretation of the Constitution. Caleb Nelson has documented how the
radical newness of the Constitution generated unresolved disagreement over
what kinds of preexisting interpretive presumptions should be used to
construe it.69 Saul Cornell’s contribution to this Symposium shows that
elite versus populist debates about interpretive method raged during the
Founding era, with the former groups advocating that the Constitution
should be read as a technical legal document employing usual lawyerly
presumptions and conventions, whereas the latter groups argued for a plain
meaning interpretation according to the understandings of the uneducated
common man.70
It is plausible to think that the limits and qualifications of the common
law and the law of nations were understood by the public of the Founding
era and later generations to have been silently incorporated into the
Constitution, limiting its otherwise unqualified rights-bearing language.
Indeed, I have previously made such an argument.71 But it also strikes me
as plausible to think that the new Constitution—especially given its new
Bill of Rights with a new judiciary to enforce it, and its structure premised
on the idea that enumeration presupposed limitation—could have been
understood to be a new birth of freedom, overriding or at least modifying
previous background norms that had limited the rights of aliens, military
enemies, and nonresidents.
So if Sachs and others who make this argument are offering a descriptive
claim about how the Constitution would have been understood, a
presumption of continuity with the past will not do. Empirical investigation

65. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 171–72, 189 (2004); Rakove, supra note 13, at 588, 592.
66. Rakove, supra note 13, at 589–92.
67. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1969).
68. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at ix (1991).
69. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
555–56, 560–78 (2003).
70. Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 738–39
(2013); see also Nelson, supra note 69, at 570 (“During the debates over ratification . . .
Federalists and Anti-Federalists divided over whether one should read the Constitution like a
lawyer at all, or instead should understand the document as a layman would.”); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 902–13
(1985) (describing battles between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the proper
interpretative methods for reading the Constitution).
71. See Kent, supra note 30, at 492; Kent, supra note 38, at 171–76; Kent, supra note
31, at 1852.
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of what the public of the Founding era actually thought about how specific,
unwritten rules of nonconstitutional law would interact with specific parts
of the new Constitution is necessary, as Sachs’s analysis of some specific
issues makes clear. But this raises two problems of its own. First, it
appears to be more of an original intent or original understanding argument
than a new originalist argument about objective public meaning. The
second difficulty is discussed in the next subsection.
6. Original Methods Originalism
A sixth possible new originalist approach to our problem is suggested by
the work of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, which they call
original methods originalism—ascertaining the original public meaning by
employing the background interpretive rules that the adopting generation
would have thought applicable.72 It is possible that there were one or more
background rules that might have helped elucidate the relationship between
the common law, the law of nations, and the Constitution.
McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory is attractive in a number of respects.
Compared to a new originalism that has the potential to allow semantic
meaning to depart dramatically from the expectations of the adopting
generation, original methods originalism better respects the choices of the
adopting generation, avoiding what might be called a bait-and-switch
problem. McGinnis and Rappaport also avoid a serious potential objection
by not presuming that any given interpretive rule is applicable; the
applicability of any rule is rather an empirical question about the
understandings of the adopting generation.73 But the theory has some
difficulties answering the problem I am posing.
We are talking now about discovering unwritten rules about how
unwritten sources of law, like the common law or the law of nations, would
interact with the new Constitution. But, in practice, it is exceedingly
difficult to pin down a majority, much less a consensus view, on a specific
question when there is neither: (1) written text to serve as a focal point of
debate and to clarify what exactly adopters were being asked to accept or
reject; (2) actual or hypothetical cases to sharpen the debate and crystallize
the issues; nor (3) a decision point that forces or at least allows many
different people to go on record with their views. It seems to me that, in
this situation, we are faced with the same type of methodological
problems—how to know unexpressed intent and determine collective intent
or understandings, and in any event, a lack of necessary written records to
do so—that many think made original intent and original understanding
originalism unworkable. Determining the intended, understood, expected,
or commonly held meanings of the Constitution’s textual provisions is
difficult enough, even though both (1) and (3) existed to help us understand
the adopting generation’s views. It seems quite unlikely that today’s
interpreters will routinely be able to discover sufficient consensus in the
72. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25.
73. Id. at 769, 783, 787.
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adopting generation about the relationship between unwritten rules of
general law and the Constitution’s text.74
7. Defining the Audience of Speakers and Readers
A final possible response of new originalism might be to define the
audience whose linguistic practices count as one which is both familiar with
the common law and the law of nations and with how those preexisting
bodies of law would fit in with the new Constitution. If made, this
question-begging move would be an extreme example of why Larry
Alexander and other critics of new originalism suggest that there is no
“non-arbitrary way of choosing” what characteristics and views the chosen
audience of speakers has.75
Old originalists presented different accounts of whose intent or
understanding mattered: drafters, ratifiers, or the public at large.76
Similarly, new originalists do not agree about who makes up the group that
is the measure of objective public meaning. As noted above, for some new
originalists, including Barnett, it is simply a “reasonable” or “reasonably
well-informed” person in late eighteenth-century America.77 For Solum, it
is “ordinary American citizen[s] fluent in English,” such as “farmers,
seamstresses, shopkeepers, and even lawyers.”78 Other new originalists
posit somewhat different groups whose linguistic practices are the measure
of meaning. McGinnis and Rappaport’s reasonable person is apparently
one who was aware of the background interpretive rules that would have
been understood to apply to legal documents like the Constitution.79 For
Michael Ramsey, the relevant group is “educated and informed speakers of
the time.”80 For Gary Lawson, it is a hypothetical person who is “fully
informed” and “know[s] all that there is to know about the Constitution and
the surrounding world.”81
These differences can matter a great deal in the foreign affairs area. The
public meaning for Lawson or McGinnis and Rappaport would likely
incorporate relevant rules of the common law and the law of nations, while
the less sophisticated audience of speakers that Barnett, Solum, and others
74. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 731, 784–85 (2010) (“Our whole constitutional history shows that in many instances
several ‘public understandings’ existed. . . . Moreover, circa 1788, many Founders in fact
believed that they had not yet established a fixed meaning for many parts of the
Constitution.”).
75. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 87, 89 n.6 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds.,
2011).
76. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 250–52
(2009).
77. See BARNETT, supra note 9, at 92.
78. Solum, supra note 13, at 3.
79. John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles As the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007).
80. Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV.
969, 975 (2008).
81. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002).
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look to likely would not. As far as I can tell, new originalism has yet to
provide a satisfactory account of how to choose its actual or hypothetical
audience whose linguistic usages and practices are the measure of meaning.
III. NEW ORIGINALISM AND THE IMPERFECTLY DRAFTED
FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION
In recent years, originalism has become methodologically self-conscious
and sophisticated; voluminous materials on the ratification of the
Constitution have been made easily available to researchers, and a large
number of academics have devoted themselves to originalist projects.
Before all this, it was said by leading scholars of foreign affairs law that the
Constitution’s text appears to leave unanswered many foreign affairs
questions.82 But now, even after all the modern developments, many
important foreign affairs law questions are still contested, difficult, and
uncertain. The drafters and ratifiers did not fully work out their thinking
and, hence, the Constitution’s text is often poorly drafted or incomplete.83
And some of the foreign affairs parts of the Constitution were written in a
loose way that is a poor fit for new originalism’s parsing of the precise
meaning of specific words and clauses in the Constitution, based in large
part on dictionaries, grammar books, and popular usage. Both of these
factors make it difficult for new originalism to settle on a clear and
uncontested original public meaning of many foreign affairs provisions.
A. The Declare War Clause
An example might help to start the discussion. Mark Tushnet recently
observed, in criticizing any originalism that claims to isolate a single
historical meaning of constitutional language, “give me an interesting term
used in a constitution, and I will find a bunch of people at the time of its
adoption who understood it to mean one thing, and a bunch of other people
who understood it to mean something else.”84 My experience in reading the
primary sources of the Founding era has confirmed the truth of this remark.
With one exception. Article I gives Congress the power to declare war,85
grant letters of marque and reprisal,86 and raise and maintain armies and
navies,87 while Article II makes the President the “Commander in Chief” of
U.S. armed forces.88 A vast array of members of the Founding generation

82. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, at
171 (4th rev. ed. 1957); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 14–15 (2d ed. 1996); HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION 68 (1990).
83. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 159–60 (1996); Flaherty, supra
note 65, at 171–72, 191; William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
983, 986, 999, 1002 (2009).
84. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 611 (2008).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13.
88. Id. art. II, § 2.
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opined without dissent that the Constitution had thereby empowered
Congress alone to decide whether to initiate foreign wars.89 Yet some
significant modern academics believe that the original meaning of the
Constitution is that the president has the authority to initiate foreign wars
because the declare war power merely authorized Congress to proclaim that
an international state of war existed, with all its attendant legal
consequences.90 Still other modern scholars believe that the original
meaning of the Constitution was unclear on who possessed war initiation
authority.91 President Truman most famously, as well as a number of other
modern presidents, acted on the basis of a modern pro-president
understanding.92
What happened? In part, the felt necessity for expansive presidential war
powers in the modern era may have subtly influenced the scholarship on
this issue—”ought” created “is.” But a large part of the reason for the
divergence between the unanimous views of the Founders and the
understandings of some modern academics is, I submit, that the drafters at
Philadelphia did not do a great job making their unanimous intentions clear
in the text. Both the Declare War Clause and Article II’s provisions
concerning executive powers were drafted quickly and debated relatively
little.93 Just looking at the Constitution’s plain text from a semantic or

89. Major figures whose views about this issue are essentially beyond dispute include
George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, James Wilson,
Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, William Paterson, James Monroe, Pierce Butler, James
Iredell, Samuel Chase, Henry Knox, and Charles Pinckney. On the other hand, I am not
aware of a single instance in which a prominent member of the Founding generation
expressed the view that the Constitution authorized the president to decide whether to initiate
a foreign war.
90. The most important works in this vein are by John Yoo. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Clio
at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169
(1999); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1643–44 (2002). Other academics share
similar views. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Erosion of the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs,
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 698 (1990); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The
War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 850–51 (1972); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An
Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and
Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1375–83 (1994) (book review); Robert F. Turner,
War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John
Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 906–10 (1994) (book review).
91. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2057–58 (2005); Stephen L. Carter, The
Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 111 (1984).
92. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 99–100 (2d ed. 2004).
93. See Treanor, supra note 83, at 999 (“[T]he records of the Philadelphia Convention
indicate that the language vesting in Congress the power to ‘declare war’ was more a product
of delegates’ dissatisfaction with the original proposal that Congress should have the power
to ‘make war,’ rather than a considered conception of what the power to ‘declare war’
meant. Their focus was on why ‘make war’ was a bad approach, rather than on why ‘declare
war’ captured their intended meaning.”); Forrest McDonald, Foreword to CHARLES C.
THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789, at xiv (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007)
(1923) (stating that by the time Article II powers were being drafted “the Convention was
nearing an end, and the delegates were tired, irritable, and eager to go home. As a
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linguistic standpoint, it is not obvious that the grant of a power to “declare
war” conveys all war initiation powers to Congress.94 The competing
view—that it was authority to proclaim an international state of war—
seems to me and many other observers a textually plausible one.
Excellent work by Michael Ramsey and Saikrishna Prakash has shown
that a likely original meaning of “declaring war” was “initiating a state of
war by a public act, and it was understood that this could be done either by
a formal declaration or by commencing armed hostilities.”95 But, in my
view, that interpretation trumps the competing one primarily on the strength
of the unanimous testimony of the founding generation and evidence of the
purposes that animated the drafting96—in other words, evidence of original
intent or original understanding, not the objective linguistic meaning of the
text.
This raises an interesting question. Why, for years after the Constitution
was adopted, do we not see any interpreters saying, “I know what the
Framers intended to say regarding war powers, but the semantic meaning of
the text that was adopted is consistent with some presidential power to
initiate war, so that is what the Constitution means”? There are probably at
least two reasons. First, and less interesting for present purposes, there was
probably not much of a political constituency that desired presidential war
initiation authority. Presidents Washington and Adams, for example, were
both comfortable with Congress taking the lead. Second, as William
Treanor has argued, it is not clear “that the original meaning of the text is
determined by reading the document closely” in the manner of
contemporary text-based originalists.97 Treanor suggests that many early
constitutional interpreters were not strict textualists in the modern style but
rather focused on “the larger purposes underlying the text” and “[s]tructural
concerns.”98 William Eskridge has made similar arguments about early
statutory interpretation.99 The structural considerations and purposes in
consequence, they became a bit careless in finishing their work. Article II, establishing the
executive branch, was therefore put together in a slipshod fashion.”).
94. See generally Robert W. Bennett, Originalism: Lessons from Things That Go
Without Saying, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 650–51 (2008) (arguing that important parts of
the Constitution were sloppily drafted or incomplete, and that certain important issues were
entirely unaddressed).
95. Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1545
(2002) (emphasis omitted); see also RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 222–35; Saikrishna Prakash,
Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by “Declare War,” 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 45 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate: A
Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685 (2002).
96. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power To Declare
War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997).
97. Treanor, supra note 10, at 488 (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 490, 501; see also Treanor, supra note 83, at 985 (stating that, for the
Founding generation, “text was not central to meaning in the way that” modern textualist
originalists assume).
99. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 998 (2001) (“The
central lesson of the early period, best embodied in the work of John Marshall, is that
statutory interpretation is all about words, but words are about much more than dictionaries
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favor of sole congressional war initiation authority were so well known and
widely accepted that it would likely have seemed outlandish to read the text
any other way.
This is not to say that text was irrelevant. Anyone reading the ratification
debates of 1787–88, or congressional debates, lawyers’ arguments, and
judicial decisions after the Constitution went into effect will find
innumerable instances of careful reading of the Constitution’s text coupled
with the assumption that the textual meaning is binding. But the Founding
era’s textual analysis was, at least for some important interpreters and in
some instances, slightly but significantly different than today’s text-based
new originalism.
B. Immigration and Unenumerated Powers
The immigration power and debate about unenumerated, inherent
legislative authority provides another example of ways the foreign affairs
Constitution was incomplete and poorly drafted, and how its text was
sometimes interpreted in a looser way than text-focused new originalism
might assume.
It has long been noted that the Constitution lacks a clear textual basis for
full congressional control over immigration.
Some aspects of an
immigration power may be implied from the Naturalization Clause, the war
powers clauses, the Foreign Commerce Clause, or perhaps even the
Migration and Importation Clause, but Congress regulates a vast array of
immigration-related matters and not all can be easily implied from these
other substantive powers. The Supreme Court has for well over a century
resolved this problem by holding that Congress’s authority to
comprehensively regulate immigration comes either wholly or in part from
extraconstitutional, inherent powers of sovereignty or international law
instead of from any textually enumerated or implied power.100
A terrific book by Ramsey applying new originalist methods asserts that
this understanding lacks any basis in the original public meaning of the
(Interestingly, Justice Scalia accepts the inherent
Constitution.101
immigration powers argument102—perhaps an example of his
faintheartedness.) According to Ramsey, the Vesting Clause of Article I
and the Tenth Amendment rather clearly state that there are no inherent,
extraconstitutional legislative powers of the national government, and that
and ordinary usage; they also involve policies chosen by the legislature and enduring
principles suggested by the common law, the law of nations, and the Constitution.”). See
generally Ethan J. Leib, Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive
Debate Between Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1905, 1916–17
(2007) (noting uncertainty and debate about the interpretive rules actually used by the
Founding generation to read the Constitution). Treanor’s and Eskridge’s views are not
universally accepted. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 793–96.
100. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1892); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–05 (1889).
101. RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 4, 54–73.
102. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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all powers not granted to the national government are reserved to the
states.103 Ramsey also notes that many prominent Federalists publicly
defended the proposed Constitution by assuring the people that the national
government only possessed those powers that the text enumerated or clearly
implied, and that all others remained with the states.104 As a result, any
legislative power over immigration not granted to Congress by the text
would be reserved to the states.105
Ramsey’s reading of the text is highly plausible, and his reporting of the
ratification debates entirely accurate. I think it is clear that he has captured
an original public meaning of the text. But is it the only original public
meaning?
Compared to other issues, the Framers did not spend as much time
thinking about or drafting foreign affairs parts of the Constitution,106 for at
least two reasons. First, the foreign affairs provisions of the Articles of
Confederation were considered to be the most successful, the least in need
of repair or wholesale change, and so were largely copied over from the old
document to the new and given to the national government.107 Certainly,
many Framers thought that new foreign affairs provisions were needed, but
these were largely additions to the Articles, not subtractions—for example:
making treaties and other federal law the supreme law of the land, creating
new federal courts to enforce treaties and the law of nations, creating a
separate executive branch, granting to Congress new legislative power over
foreign commerce and the law of nations, as well as new direct powers of
taxation to fund the national government. The new document split foreign
affairs powers held by the Continental Congress between wholly new
institutions: a Congress, its upper house, a president, and federal courts.
Probably less attention was devoted to dividing powers between these
institutions than the importance and complexity of the topic warranted.
Second, the Framers shared more common goals and ideas about foreign

103. RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 17, 199–201.
104. Id. at 17–18.
105. Id. at 202–04.
106. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND.
L.J. 1333, 1339–40 (2006) (stating that the Declare War Clause “was not a first order issue”
for the Philadelphia Convention and so the Framers “fashioned a text that neither fully
captured their intentions nor resolved the types of issues that have become pressing to us”).
107. It was not until relatively late in the Philadelphia Convention that the enumeration of
the legislative powers emerged. Before then, the convention was satisfied with the following
principles: “That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation”—i.e., authority to control war and foreign
affairs—“and moreover to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and
also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony
of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.” 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
Compared to the attention given to other issues at Philadelphia, not a lot of time was spent
on debating the specific enumerations that replaced this formula and became Article I,
Section 8. See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for
Protecting Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 373–74 (2007).

2013]

NEW ORIGINALISM AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

777

affairs than many domestic issues.108 As a result, foreign affairs issues
generally received less time and attention and the Framers did not reach
consensus in their conceptions or achieve specificity in the text for many
separation of powers questions.109 I am, of course, not saying that there
was no controversy, debate, or attention to foreign affairs matters, for of
course there was.110
As Treanor writes, “the way in which the Constitution was drafted—
often at great speed and with many critical questions unresolved”—may
“suggest[] the appropriateness of an open-ended interpretive process that
considers many variables and does not limit the analysis to text.”111 How
might the rather hastily drafted foreign affairs portions of the Constitution
have looked using a looser, more structure- and purpose-focused manner of
reading text than some new originalists do today?
Although the principle of enumeration as limitation was central to the
Federalists’ defense of the Constitution, many also believed that the
Constitution that emerged from Philadelphia had given the national
government enormous and nearly unlimited power in foreign affairs, and
certainly enough power to accomplish all purposes for which the federal
government existed. As Mark Graber has explained,
When Federalists spoke about federal authority, they consistently asserted
that the federal government had the power to meet all national
concerns. . . . Few Federalists thought seriously about the legal
significance of enumerated powers because they still preferred
constitutional politics to constitutional law as the best means for
restraining national officials.112

Thus, prominent Framers declared that the Constitution they had written
created a government that would, in Hamilton’s words, “contain in itself
every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed
to its care.”113 John Jay described the Constitution as forming a “national
government, competent to every national object.”114 Hamilton explained:
As the duties of superintending the national defence and of securing the
public peace against foreign or domestic violence, involve a provision for
casualties and dangers, to which no possible limits can be assigned, the

108. FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 143 (1973).
109. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725
(1996).
110. Whether to allow the national government to create a “standing army,” for example,
was enormously controversial. For a helpful summary of debates about war and foreign
affairs powers at Philadelphia and in the state ratifying conventions, see ABRAHAM D.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 25–59 (1976).
111. Treanor, supra note 83, at 985.
112. Graber, supra note 107, at 375.
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 212 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cynthia Brantley Johnson
ed., 2004).
114. Graber, supra note 107, at 375 (emphasis omitted).
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power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the
exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.115

Madison agreed that the Convention had drafted “a Constitution fully
adequate to the national defence and the preservation of the Union,” and
that “[t]he means of security”—the powers granted to the federal
government by the Constitution for national defense—“can only be
regulated by the means and the danger of attack,” that is, must be
essentially unlimited.116 Because “[i]t is in vain to oppose constitutional
barriers to the impulse of self-preservation,” the Philadelphia Convention
had not attempted to do so.117 As Graber describes it, “Proponents of
ratification in 1787 and 1788 indiscriminately combined assertions that
federal powers were limited with assertions that Congress was authorized to
regulate all matters of national importance.”118
In other words, a case might be made that the Constitution was
understood by some to have granted more foreign relations and national
defense powers to the federal government than parsing the strict semantic or
linguistic meaning of its words would seem to convey. I should emphasize
that I am only sketching the outlines of this argument here, not claiming to
have conclusively documented it.
There are some indications in the years after the Constitution was
adopted that this looser way of reading the Constitution was in play. Soon
after the Constitution was ratified and the new government was up and
running, it became clear that a careful textual exegesis of the foreign affairs
Constitution revealed some gaps. But some Federalists did not see this as
problematic because of the widely shared assumption that the national
government had been granted by the Constitution every power necessary to
accomplish its ends, which included national defense and foreign relations.
So early on, the power to punish sedition, to regulate immigration and
deportation, and to acquire new territory were said by some to be derived
from the general nature and powers of the powerful federal government
created by the Constitution to manage foreign affairs and defend the
nation.119 This understanding was subtly but importantly different from the
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 113, at 212; see also id.
NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 113, at 161 (“[I]t is both unwise and dangerous to
deny the Fæderal Government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are
intrusted to its management.”).
116. Id. NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 113, at 289, 293.
117. Id. at 289.
118. Graber, supra note 107, at 374.
119. See, e.g., REPORT OF A SELECT COMMITTEE MADE TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON FEB. 25, 1799, reprinted in 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986 (1799) (arguing
that Congress had authority to pass the Alien Act because of “the common practice of
nations,” “the power of war and peace, [which] according to the theory of the Constitution,
belongs to the Government of the United States,” the Republican Government Clause, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2146 (1798) (statement of Rep.
Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, Mass.) (arguing that Congress has authority to enact the
Sedition Act because “every independent Government has a right to preserve and defend
itself against injuries and outrages which endanger its existence”); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1986
(1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, Mass.) (arguing that Congress has
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claims heard later in the nineteenth century that the national government
possessed some wholly unenumerated, extratextual foreign relations powers
merely by virtue of sovereignty or international law.120 The earlier idea
was that the vesting of foreign affairs and national defense powers in the
national government had been so complete and exhaustive that
unmentioned powers of that nature that served the same purposes could be
considered impliedly granted. This implication arose perhaps from the
overall structure and purposes of the document, or perhaps from broad
clauses like the Preamble’s statement that the Constitution was formed to,
among other things, “provide for the common defence,” or the Article I,
Section 8 grant of authority to Congress to tax and spend for the common
defense.121 This is similar—not identical, but similar—to what Chief
Justice John Marshall later did in McCulloch v. Maryland. After noting that
“[t]his government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated
powers,”122 he nevertheless proceeded to read the enumerations in a broad
authority to enact the Alien Act because “it was the design of the Federal Constitution to
embrace all our exterior relations. The great objects of peace and war, negotiations with
foreign countries, the general peace and welfare of the United States, must be provided for
and maintained by the National Government. . . . If Congress has the right to defend the
Union, it has certainly a right to prepare for defen[s]e”); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983–84
(1798) (statement of Rep. William Gordon, Federalist, N.H.) (locating Congress’s authority
to enact the Alien Act in “the sovereign power of every nation . . . to protect itself,” and
“from the power of making war, and providing for the general welfare”).
120. Perhaps not surprising, those ideas gained prominence during the existential crisis of
the Civil War. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3308 (1864) (remarks of Sen.
John Hale, Republican, N.H.) (“It seems to have been considered by most of the gentlemen
who have addressed the Senate that all the powers this nation has got it gets under the
Constitution. No such thing, sir. If that were the case we should be in the condition of the
Episcopal minister who was called upon to pray with a man who had been gored by a bull.
He turned the prayer-book over and over from end to end and found no prayer for a man
gored by a bull, and he told the man he could not pray for him, as there was nothing of that
sort in the prayer-book. . . Just so it is here. We suppose that all the powers that this nation
has got are prescribed in the Constitution. Have we no necessary powers as a nation, as a
sovereignty, for our own preservation . . . ?”); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2964
(1862) (remarks of Sen. Charles Sumner, Republican, Mass.) (“I claim for Congress all that
belongs to any Government in the exercise of the rights of war.”); Woodbury Davis,
Political Problems and Conditions of Peace, 12 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 252, 252 (1863)
(“Over those interests which are committed to its care [the federal government] has all the
powers incident to any other government in the world . . . .”).
The Supreme Court hinted at the concept of inherent sovereign powers of national
defense to sustain Congress’s wartime legal tender legislation. See Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 529 (1870) (noting that it is “a power confessedly possessed by every
independent sovereignty other than the United States”); id. at 555–56 (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (stating that the national government created by the Constitution was “[a]s a
government invested with all the attributes of sovereignty,” and has those powers which, at
the time the Constitution was adopted, “were generally considered to belong to every
government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions”). For an
argument that the idea of inherent, unenumerated foreign affairs powers derived principally
from later nineteenth-century case law about regulating immigration and governing newly
acquired territory and Indian tribes, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over
Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
122. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
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and general way and held that in creating such a government of awesome
powers, the People, through the Constitution, intended to grant Congress
ample means to carry out the great objectives of the union.123
I am not arguing that the original public meaning of the Constitution’s
text was that Congress possessed inherent, unenumerated powers in foreign
affairs and national defense. My point is more narrow: for some important
Founding-era interpreters, a reading of the Constitution based strictly on the
semantic meaning of the specific enacted clauses was insufficient, because
it failed to account for what they understood to have been the vesting by the
Constitution of all necessary foreign affairs and national defense powers in
the federal government. How prominent this reading was is an empirical
question. My sense—I have not exhaustively tried to research and
document this—is that Ramsey’s reading of the text was more common and
influential than the alternate one I have sketched here. But a complete
account of the original public meaning of the text should encompass all of
the many contested views and indeterminacies. In my opinion, a strict
textualism does not provide a fully satisfactory account.
CONCLUSION
This Article is the work of an interested observer rather than a partisan in
the intense methodological disputes within the various originalist camps
and between originalists and their critics. I do not think originalism is all
“bunk.”124 In fact, I have several times attempted to uncover the original
meaning of parts of the Constitution because I think that it is a crucially
important aspect of constitutional interpretation.125 But I am skeptical of
originalism’s claim to be the sole legitimate method of interpretation.
This skepticism is not so much philosophical as practical. Just as no
previous prophet or church has ever succeeded in convincing all of
humanity that he, she, or it represents the one true faith, I think it is
inevitable that there will continue to be a very wide diversity of
methodological approaches used by all the various kinds of people who
interpret and apply the Constitution—private lawyers, judges, executive
branch advisers, members of Congress and their staffs, state and local
officials, public intellectuals, participants in social movements, and
ordinary Americans.
Participating in a public discourse about the Constitution’s meaning,
therefore, requires speaking the languages of the many different methods of
interpretation—including, of course, new originalism. This is particularly
true in the foreign affairs area where, as noted in the Introduction to this
Article, the Supreme Court and the political branches tend not to be very
originalist.

123. Id. at 407–08.
124. See Berman, supra note 9.
125. See Kent, supra note 30; J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power To
Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843 (2007).
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In addition, new originalism and its method of parsing the objective
semantic meaning of the enacted text struggle to interpret certain foreign
affairs aspects of the Constitution. Because of its focus on the meaning of
the written text to an audience of ordinary Americans, the method has
trouble explaining when and whether unwritten doctrines of the common
law and the law of nations should be understood to limit otherwise broad
language in the Constitution. And new originalism arguably commits the
“aesthetic fallacy”126 when it fails to grapple with the fact that many foreign
affairs provisions of the Constitution were written hastily, sloppily, and
incompletely, and were not interpreted by many members of the founding
generation in a modern, strictly textualist manner.

126. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional
Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1617 (1997) (describing the “Aesthetic Fallacy” of
constitutional interpretation as the assumption that “the Constitution is like a poem, a
symphony, or a great work of political philosophy. Each word and every phrase must come
together to form a harmonious and pleasing composition”); see also Curtis A. Bradley &
Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV.
545, 553–54 (2004) (invoking Eisgruber’s “aesthetic fallacy” and noting that a certain
originalist “textual argument assumes a level of precision on the part of the Founders that
may be unrealistic”).

